08 March 2011

No-Fly Zone




With the current situation in Libya, we are seeing more and more calls for a no-fly zone to be imposed over Libya to stop the Libyan air force's attacks on protestors and anti-regime insurgents. Ostensibly, this would be to aid the insurgents in their efforts to weaken Col. Qaddafi. Doing this may, in my opinion, pose serious risks that may not be acceptable to the public in the United States and other NATO countries.

Of course, to inform this discussion, we must establish what a no-fly zone is. Salon.com just published an excellent description of a no-fly zone in a nice Reader's Digest sort of form here. Basically, a no-fly zone is to send aircraft up to patrol a piece of airspace where certain aircraft are forbidden. Additionally, this requires the defeat of any air defense assets in the no-fly zone area. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the point about the air defenses clear in a recent speech.

Since a no-fly zone is an act of war, a good model to examine it is in the way that wars are studied, using the ends, ways, means and risks model. This is a model used by any of the war colleges or in any strategy and policy class.

First, to what end would a no-fly zone be created? When examining this, we must remember what Carl von Clausewitz had to say in On War, "War is a continuation of politics through other means." With this in mind, a no-fly zone must be done with a political objective if it is to have any hope of success. The political objective of this would probably be to, as stated earlier, topple the regime of Col. Qaddafi. That is simple enough. Things will get trickier though.

Next in our analysis is the ways. The way this no-fly zone would be established is by patrolling the airspace over Libya. As stated earlier, the first thing that would have to be done is to go and destroy all of Libya's surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) assets. Depending on the type of air defense system set up by Qaddafi, there may be SAM and AAA sites inside of major cities. Additionally, there may be known air defense sites inside of rebel-held territory. Should those sites be destroyed, lest they be used against NATO aircraft in the event of Qaddafi's forces retaking the area? That is a question to be answered in the "risks" part of our analysis. Also, what are the rules of engagement for any Libyan aircraft that are spotted? Must they fire upon people on the ground to be engaged? Must they fire upon the patrolling aircraft? Can they be shot down as soon as they take off? These are difficult questions that will also be examined more in the risks.

Next in our analysis is to look at the means. This should not be a big deal. There are American naval assets all over the Mediterranean that can easily be called upon. Furthermore, there are numerous NATO member states all over Europe from which to launch patrols of any no-fly zone. Furthermore, defeating the Libyan air force would be no big deal. Based on a somewhat cursory search of Libya's air force, the heart of their air force is in the MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-23 Flogger and the Sukhoi SU-22 Fitter. These are severely outdated aircraft that would be no match against any of NATO's fighter aircraft.

The tricky part of the equation is the risks. As we asked earlier, which ground-based air defense assets should be taken out? If any rebel-held air defenses are attacked, accidentally or on purpose, it would probably alienate the rebels. Imagine a rebel-held AAA site being taken out by an American warplane, when this site was perhaps being used by the rebels to defend against Libyan air force attacks. This might even solidify support of Qaddafi, supporting his claim that the uprisings are being done by America in order to destroy Libya. As for the rules of engagement, what happens if an aircraft that is trying to defect is shot down? This would also alienate the rebels.

On a bigger scale, a no-fly zone over Libya could be viewed as even more US and Israeli aggression in the Middle East. After what has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, the people of the Arab world are probably far more likely to support even the worst dictator if they are opposed to the US. This could make our job in the Middle East even trickier.

Also, could we see a protracted situation like what happened in Iraq if it does not immediately topple Qaddafi? Is the United States willing to have aircraft patrolling Libya 24/7 for the next ten years? I would argue not.

From all of this, I would submit that we should not impose a no-fly zone over Libya. We can provide moral support, call for Qaddafi's departure, or even supply weapons and supplies to the rebels, but I do not think that the United States can afford to get into another Middle East adventure. That is all. For now.